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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PERSONAL JURISDICTION-THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE VS. LONG-ARM CLAIMS FOR INCREASED CHILD SUP-
PORT. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
As a result of the rising divorce rate and increased mobility
of the American people, former spouses no longer tend to remain
within the marital state. When the custodial parent seeks in-
creased support for her children from a parent living in another
state, due process requires that the court acquire personal juris-
diction over the nonresident parent.' Until recently the United
States Supreme Court has declined to rule on the use of long-arm
statutes to obtain personal jurisdiction over nonresident defen-
dants in domestic relations actions. 2 Several state courts have
treated this silence as implicit approval of the use of long-arm
statutes and have held that marital support cases are peculiarly
suited to the concept of "minimum contacts" in personam juris-
diction. 3 In Kulko v. Superior Court,4 however, the Supreme
Court addressed the issue and reversed a California Supreme
Court decision5 that had upheld personal jurisdiction acquired
pursuant to the broad California long-arm statute.' In the major-
ity opinion written by Mr. Justice Marshall, the Court held that
a New York father who sent his daughter to live with her mother
in California did not have "minimum contacts" sufficient to con-
fer personal jurisdiction over him in the California courts in a suit
to obtain additional child support.7
1. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
2. Mizner v. Mizner, 84 Nev. 268, 439 P.2d 679, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968);
Van Wagenberg v. Van Wagenberg, 241 Md. 154, 215 A.2d 812, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 833
(1966); Soule v. Soule, 193 Cal. App. 2d 443, 14 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 985 (1962).
3. E.g., Pinebrook v. Pinebrook, 329 So. 2d 343 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Whitaker
v. Whitaker, 237 Ga. 895, 230 S.E.2d 486 (1976); Mitchim v. Mitchim, 518 S.W.2d 362,
365 (Tex. 1975).
4. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
5. Kulko v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 514, 564 P.2d 353, 138 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1977),
aff'g, 133 Cal. Rptr. 627 (1976). The decision at the trial level appears to be unreported.
6. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973) provides that "[a] court of this state
may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state
or of the United States."
7. 436 U.S. at 92.
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I. THE Kulko Decision
In 1959 appellant Ezra Kulko and appellee Sharon Kulko
Horn, both New York domiciliaries, married while he was on a
three-day military stopover in California. During their married
life in New York, two children were born: a son Darwin in 1961
and a daughter Ilsa in 1962. When the couple separated in March
1972, the mother moved to San Francisco, California. In Septem-
ber 1972 she flew to New York City to sign a written separation
agreement which provided that the children would spend the
school year with their father and vacations with their mother.
Ezra also agreed to pay $3,000 per year in child support for the
periods when the children were with their mother.8 Payments
were to be mailed to California or wherever she might be living.9
He agreed to pay all of the children's educational, clothing, medi-
cal, hospital, and dental expenses."° He also agreed to indemnify
Sharon for costs, expenses, and attorney's fees that she might
incur as a result of his future default in the performance of the
terms and conditions of the agreement." Sharon then flew to
Haiti with a power of attorney signed by Ezra and was granted a
divorce that incorporated the terms of their written agreement.
She then returned to California. The agreement was performed
until December 1973, when Ilsa told her father that she wished
to remain with her mother following the Christmas vacation. Ezra
bought Ilsa a one-way plane ticket to California. Ilsa returned
only to visit her father for summer vacations during the following
two years. In January 1976, following Darwin's request to live
with his mother, Sharon sent her son a plane ticket without
Ezra's knowledge. Shortly thereafter she brought an action to
establish the Haitian divorce decree as a California judgment, to
modify the judgment to award her full custody of the children,
and to increase appellant's child-support obligations. 2
Ezra appeared specially and moved to quash service of the
summons on the grounds that he was a nonresident and lacked
the minimum contacts necessary for personal jurisdiction.'3 His
motion was denied by the trial court. He then petitioned for a writ
8. Id. at 86-87.
9. Id. at 93-94 n.6.
10. Brief of Appellee at app. 8, 10 (Separation Agreement).
11. Id. at 11. 436 U.S. at 95 n.8.
12. 436 U.S. at 87-88.
13. Id. at 88.
[Vol. 31
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of mandate" in the California Court of Appeals, challenging the
lower court's jurisdiction only over the claim for increased sup-
port. 5 The appellate court affirmed, reasoning that because Ezra
had consented to his children's decision to live with their mother
in California, he had "caused an effect in the state by an act done
elsewhere,"'" thereby warranting the court's exercise of jurisdic-
tion.'7
The California Supreme Court affirmed.'" Noting the broad
intent of the California Code of Civil Procedure, 9 the court agreed
that the father had caused an effect in the state by an act or
omission outside the state and that the exercise of jurisdiction
was reasonable. Ezra had "purposely availed himself of the bene-
fits and protections of the laws of California""0 by sending his
daughter to live on a permanent basis with her mother in Califor-
nia. He had also derived the economic benefit of not paying sup-
port for the child during the school year although he was obli-
gated to do so under the existing agreement.2' The complaint
sought support for both children and appellant asserted lack of
jurisdiction over both children. The court, however, concluded
14. A writ of mandate, similar to a writ of mandamus, issues from a court of superior
jurisdiction and directs that action be taken or disposition be made of the case by the
inferior court. CAL. CIv. Peoc. CODE § 1085 (West 1955).
15. 133 Cal. Rptr. at 627. The father did not challenge the court's jurisdiction to
determine custody. Id. The children's physical presence and domicile within the bound-
aries of the state at the time the proceedings were instituted, coupled with the mother's
residence in the state, gave the California courts jurisdiction to entertain proceedings
touching the custody of the children. Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 777-79,
197 P.2d 739, 749-50 (1948); CAL. CIv. CODE § 5152 (West Supp. 1979). See Titus v.
Superior Court, 23 Cal. App. 3d 792, 797-98, 100 Cal. Rptr. 477, 481-82 (Ct. App. 1972);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 79 (1971).
16. 133 Cal. Rptr. at 628. The court's decision was based on RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLiCT OF LAWS § 27 (1971), which was incorporated into California law by Judicial
Council Comment (9) to CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973). The Comment
provides in part:
A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who
causes effects in the state by an. . . act done elsewhere with respect to causes
of action arising from these effects, unless the nature of the effects and of the
individual's relationship to the state make the exercise of such jurisdiction
unreasonable.
Id.
17. 133 Cal. Rptr. at 628.
18. Kulko v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 514, 564 P.2d 353, 138 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1977).
19. See note 6 supra. The United States Supreme Court noted that the California
Supreme Court opinion had not distinguished between the state and federal constitutional
requirements. 436 U.S. at 89 n.3.
20. 19 Cal. 3d at 522, 564 P.2d at 356, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
21. Id. at 521-22, 524, 564 P.2d at 356, 358, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 589-91.
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that it was fair and reasonable to subject the appellant to per-
sonal jurisdiction with respect to the support of both children,
even though he had not participated in his son's move to Califor-
nia, and thus had not "caused an effect" within the state with
respect to his son.
22
The United States Supreme Court, treating Ezra Kulko's
appeal as a petition for a writ of certiorari,23 reversed. 24 The Court
ruled that the father's acquiescence in his daughter's desire to
live in California with her mother was in the interest of family
harmony and could not be equated with "'purposefully
avail[ing] himself' of the 'benefits and protections' ",25 of the
laws of California sufficiently to lead him reasonably to expect to
be subject to suit in California. In the first part of a two-pronged
test, the Court questioned whether the father had received any
personal benefits from the laws of California. It found that such
benefits as police and fire protection, the school system, and hos-
pital services were provided by California to thb daughter and not
to the father. 26 The Court also ruled that Ezra had not received
financial benefit from his daughter's stay in California warrant-
ing the exercise of in personam jurisdiction. "Any diminution in
. . . household costs resulted, not from the child's presence in
California, but rather from her absence from appellant's home."
The mother's failure to use the New York courts when the de facto
modification of the custody provisions and need for increased
support occurred resulted in the father's ultimate financial ad-
vantage. 28 The Court reasoned that the lower courts had confused
the question of liability with the determination of which forum
22. Id. at 525, 564 P.2d at 358-59, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 591-92. The court found that
because the father purchased his daughter's plane ticket and sent her to live with her
mother in California, he thereby caused an effect within the state. Because the mother
had arranged for the son to come to California without the father's knowledge, however,
the court reasoned the father had not caused an effect with respect to his son.
23. 436 U.S. at 90 n.4. The Court noted that since the issue was not the constitution-
ality of the statute itself but its application in this case, jurisdiction by appeal did not
lie. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1976). It also noted that appellant alternatively had requested
that the papers be acted upon as a petition for certiorari pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2103
(1976). The Court's treatment in disregarding formalities previously had been followed in
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 244 (1958), and May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 530
(1953).
24. 436 U.S. at 90.
25. Id. at 94.
26. Id. at n.7.
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was proper to decide that liability. 9
In the second part of its test, the Court found no basis on
which Ezra reasonably could have anticipated being" 'haled be-
fore a [California] court' ",30 when he accepted his daughter's
decision to live with her mother. This conclusion may be ques-
tioned. Surely Ezra could not have expected his daughter's needs
to have been satisfied for nine months on the amount of money
he had agreed to provide for three months of support. The Court's
concern with Ezra's "substantial financial burden and personal
strain of litigating a child-support suit in a forum 3,000 miles
away" 31 seems undercut by the indemnification provision of the
separation agreement in which the father promised to pay all
costs and fees resulting from a default in his agreement to pay all
obligations incurred for his daughter's education, clothing, medi-
cal, hospital, and dental services. 32 Furthermore, if Sharon had
been forced to go to New York, she and the children would have
faced the emotional strain of the suit and a possible separation
for that period. Perhaps, the Court was giving more attention to
the burden that would be placed on family relations if the sup-
porting parent were subject to the jurisdiction of the foreign court
in whichever state his child chose to reside."
In addition, the Court found that the California courts' reli-
ance on the assertion of jurisdiction based on the "effects" test
of the American Law Institute's Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws § 3734 was misplaced in this case. First, there was no
physical injury to persons or property within the state. Second,
the cause of action arose from personal domestic relations and not
from commercial transactions in interstate commerce. Third, no
commercial benefit was sought from the solicitation of business
from a California resident. Fourth, the controversy arose from an
agreement that had no connection with California law.35
The Court pointed to New York as the proper forum for the
suit. The negotiation and signing of the separation agreement had
taken place in New York, the parties' former marital domicile.
Ezra had remained in New York while Sharon had moved to
29. Id. at 95-96.
30. Id. at 97-98 (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977)).
31. 436 U.S. at 97.
32. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
33. See 436 U.S. at 98.
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFuc'r OF LAWS § 37 (1971). See note 16 supra.
35. See 436 U.S. at 96-97.
1980]
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California." Although California might have been the "center of
gravity" for choice-of-law purposes because the children and their
mother resided there, the choice of California law did "not mean
that California [had] personal jurisdiction over Ezra." 37
The Court noted that California had enacted no special juris-
dictional statute signifying its specialized interest in such cases."8
The Court's interest in such a specialized statute may stem from
the general proposition that courts seldom like to intrude into
intricate and sensitive family relations, perhaps believing that a
consensual change of custody in the best interests of the children
should be encouraged and that the possibility of the children's
custodial parent shopping for the parent's best interests in a dis-
tant state should be avoided. The Court recognized California's
substantial and important interests in the welfare of its minor
residents, but found that these interests were protected by the
mother's alternative of proceeding under the Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act of 1968.11 The Court noted that the
36. Id. at 97.
37. Id. at 98. Accord, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 215 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958).
38. 436 U.S. at 98. See notes 114-15 & 117-19 infra for examples of the domestic
relations long-arm statutes that have been adopted in several jurisdictions.
39. 436 U.S. at 98-99. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 1650-1656 (West 1972 & West
Supp. 1979). The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) was drafted
and approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
1950. 9 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 643 (1973). It was amended in 1952 and 1958 and was revised
in 1968. Id. URESA is presently in force in one form or another in all fifty states, the
District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. Id. at 644.
The normal procedure in a URESA action involves filing a simplified petition in a court
in the state where the family has been deserted (called the initiating state). Id. § 13 at
686. If the judge finds that the facts show the existence of a duty of support, he sends the
petition and a copy of the Act to a court of the responding state to which the husband
has fled or in which he has property. That court will take the necessary steps to obtain
jurisdiction of the husband or his property, will hold a hearing, and may order the defen-
dant to furnish support. The responding state then sends a copy of the support order and
transfers payments made by the defendant pursuant to the order to the initiating state.
Id. § 24 at 713. See also S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-110 to -470 (1976).
Although URESA may be the sole alternative to traveling to the defendant's forum
available to the plaintiff, the Act provides only a cumbersome procedure. The responding
court may not impose conditions in its order, such as visitation rights, that are not a part
of the subject matter of a URESA proceeding. Hoover v. Hoover, 271 S.C. 177, 181, 246
S.E.2d 179, 181 (1978). In addition, the plaintiff, who is not present at the responding
court hearing and must rely on the petition, may not be able to rebut effectively the
defendant's allegations for reducing or denying the support requested. See generally Eh-
renzweig, Interstate Recognition of Support Duties, 42 CAL. L. Rav. 382 (1954); Note,
Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Alimony and Custody Cases, 73 CoLuM. L. Rv. 289, 306-07
(1973); Note, The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, 13 STAN. L. REV. 901,
6
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denial of personal jurisdiction over Ezra Kulko in California did
not leave Sharon at a "severe disadvantage."4
In a brief dissent, Mr. Justice Brennan concluded that the
father's connection with California was "not too attenuated,
under the standards of reasonableness and fairness implicit in the
Due Process Clause, to require him to conduct his defense in the
California Courts."4 While he did not find the majority's decision
"implausible," he preferred to agree with the California Supreme
Court determination. 42
I1. BASES FOR LONG-ARM JURISDICTION
Before a court may exercise jurisdiction over the parties there
must be a legislative basis for jurisdiction giving the court power
to act, and there must be an effective exercise of that power
supported by adequate notice and opportunity to be heard.43 A
determination of the adequacy of the basis upon which state-
court jurisdiction rests involves the following two-step inquiry:
(1) whether the acquisition of jurisdiction by the court is author-
ized by a state statute, and (2) whether the exercise of such juris-
diction comports with federal constitutional standards. The
broad California authorization statute treats the two questions as
one by making no distinction between the state and federal con-
stitutions. 44 When the constitutional exercise of in personam ju-
risdiction over a nonresident defendant is sought, the test first
enunciated in International Shoe Co. v. Washington45 must be
met. In that case the Court described the test as follows:
915-19 (1961). Specific jurisdictional statutes adopted in several jurisdictions may be used
to replace URESA actions under certain circumstances. See notes 102-03 & 105-07 infra.
40. 436 U.S. at 100 n.15 (comparing the conclusion in McGee that resident plaintiffs
would be severely disadvantaged if in personam jurisdiction over out-of-state insurance
companies were unavailable. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222
(1967)).
41. 436 U.S. at 102. (Brennan, J., joined by White and Powell, JJ., dissenting).
42. Id.
43. In Kulko, the father did not contest notice since he was given actual notice by
service of summons by mail in New York pursuant to CAL. CIV. CODE § 5154 (West Supp.
1979) and appeared only to contest jurisdiction. See 436 U.S. at 91; 19 Cal. 3d at 520, 564
P.2d at 355, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 588. Service of summons by mail would satisfy the constitu-
tional requirements enunciated in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306 (1950) (notice must be by means reasonably calculated to give actual notice),
and Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (opportunity to be heard must be given at a
meaningful time).
44. See notes 6 & 19 supra.
45. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
1980]
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[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant
to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with
it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'.
Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the
quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and
orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of
the due process clause to insure. That clause does not contem-
plate that a state may make binding a judgment in personam
against an individual or corporate defendant with which the
state has no contacts, ties, or relations."
The Court in International Shoe noted that although an estimate
of the inconveniences of litigating in a distant forum is relevant,"
"minimum contacts" cannot be measured by mechanical or
quantitative standards."9 The Court found that the exercise of
jurisdiction was reasonable when the obligation sued upon arose
out of the nonresident corporate defendant's systematic and con-
tinuous activities within the state. 9
After International Shoe, the minimum-contacts analysis
was used to determine whether a nonresident defendant's activi-
ties were pervasive enough to permit the assertion of general juris-
diction over any and all claims against the defendant, or whether
a nonresident defendant's activities were such that the assertion
of jurisdiction would be permitted only for a specific cause of
action that arose out of the defendant's activity within the
forum." The Court, in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining
Co.,' allowed the assertion of general jurisdiction over a foreign
46. Id. at 316, 319.
47. Id. at 317; see Taylor v. Portland Paramount Corp., 383 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1967)
(due process is not satisfied by the mere fact that the forum is not inconvenient to the
defendant).
48. 326 U.S. at 319.
49. Id. at 320.
50. See generally von Mehren and Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Sug-
gested Analysis, 79 HARVARD L. Rav. 1121 (1966). The authors suggest general jurisdiction
is based upon three types of relationship between the defendant and the forum: domicile
or habitual residence; presence; or consent. Id. at 1137. With general jurisdiction any kind
of controversy may be adjudicated. It may be unlimited, i.e., effective against all of the
defendant's property, or it may be limited in effectiveness to the property involved in the
suit. Id. at 1136, 1139. Under specific jurisdiction, however, only a controversy related to
the circumstances upon which jurisdiction is predicated may be adjudicated. Id. at 1144-
45.
51. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
[Vol. 31
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corporation based on contacts other than those from which the
cause of action arose.2 Five years later the Court, in McGee v.
International Life Insurance Co.,53 upheld the exercise of specific
jurisdiction over an insurance company whose only contact with
the state of California was the policy upon which suit was
brought. The Court held that "it is sufficient for purposes of due
process that the suit was based on a contract which had substan-
tial connection with that State."54 The Court noted the clearly
discernible trend "toward expanding the permissible scope of
state jurisdiction,' '5 California's strong statutorily delineated
regulatory interest, and the insured's severe disadvantage if a
forum for redress were not provided."
In Hanson v. Dencka57 the Supreme Court reversed the trend
toward expansion of state-court jurisdiction by saying that
It is a mistake to assume that this trend [of expanding personal
jurisdiction over nonresidents] heralds the eventual demise of
all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts ....
Those restrictions are . . . a consequence of territorial limita-
tions on the power of the respective States ...
[Imt is essential in each case that there be some act by which
the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of con-
ducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws."
The Court held Florida was unable to constitutionally subject a
Delaware corporate trustee to the jurisdiction of its courts in a
suit to determine the validity of a trust. The connection of the
trust with Florida had resulted from the settlor's "unilaterial ac-
tivity" in moving to Florida. 9 The trustee, however, had not per-
52. Von Mehren and Trautman, supra note 50, at 1144, suggest that "the Perkins case
should be regarded as a decision on its exceptional facts, nof as a significant reaffirmation
of obsolescing notions of general jurisdiction."
53. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
54. Id. at 223.
55. Id. at 222.
56. Id. at 223. After Kulko, McGee seems limited in its application to cases in which
the state has expressed a specific statutory interest in regulating the industry's affairs and
in which the resident plaintiff would be at a severe disadvantage if personal jurisdiction
were not available. See, e.g., Foster, Expanding Jurisdiction over Nonresidents, 32 Wis.
BAR BULL. 20 (Supp. Oct. 1959); Hazard, A General Theory of State Court Jurisdiction,
1965 Sup. CT. Rxv. 241.
57. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
58. Id. at 251, 253.
59. Id. at 252.
19801
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formed any acts in Florida related to the trust agreement; thus,
there were no contacts that could be equated with the purposeful
and beneficial insurance solicitation in McGee." The Court in
Hanson also held that jurisdiction was not acquired merely as a
result of the state's being the "'center of gravity' of the contro-
versy or the most convenient location for litigation."'" The issue
of personal jurisdiction must be resolved by considering the acts
of the defendant. 2
Until recently state courts were given little additional guid-
ance by the Supreme Court in the exercise of long-arm jurisdic-
tion. Many courts placed increasing emphasis on the concept of
"fundamental fairness" reflected in the International Shoe
phrase "fair play and substantial justice," and on the McGee
decision, rather than on the Hanson limitation of purposeful
connections with the state."' On a case-by-case basis courts have
weighed and balanced such considerations as the quantity, qual-
ity, and nature of the defendant's activities within the forum, the
extent to which the cause of action arose out of those activities,
the state's interest in regulating the business concerned, and the
procedural conveniences of the presence of witnesses and the
availability of evidence.64
III. Shaffer AND Kulko: RECENT RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF
LONG-ARM JURISDICTION
In a 1977 plurality decision, Shaffer v. Heitner,65 the Su-
preme Court reaffirmed its stand against expansion of state
courts' personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. The
Court denied a stockholder's derivative action based on quasi in
60. Id.
61. Id. at 254.
62. Id.
63. Casad, Shaffer v. Heitner: An End to Ambivalence in Jurisdiction Theory?, 26
KAN. L. REv. 61, 64 (1977); Casad, Long Arm and Convenient Forum, 20 KAN. L. Rav. 1,
11-12 (1971).
64. See, e.g., Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187, 197 (8th Cir. 1965) (Mr.
Justice Blackmun, then Circuit Judge, noted three primary factors: the quantity of con-
tacts, the nature and quality of contacts, and the source and connection of the cause of
action with those contacts; and two other factors of mention: the interest of the forum
state and inconvenience); Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d
67, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969); Fisher Governor v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 222, 347 P.2d
1 (1959); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 111. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d
761 (1961).
65. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
[Vol. 31
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rem jurisdiction over the nonresident corporate directors' shares
in the Delaware corporation involved." Unable to assert in per-
sonam jurisdiction over the twenty-eight defendants, the Dela-
ware court, pursuant to Delaware laws, 7 sequestered the stock
and options of twenty-one defendants. Therefore, jurisdiction was
based on the presence of that property and not on defendants'
status as corporate fiduciaries or on their contacts with the
state." The United States Supreme Court held that "all asser-
tions of state court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to
the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny."' 9
When direct assertion of personal jurisdiction would violate the
Constitution, any indirect assertion of jirisdiction not based on
the existence of ties between the state, the defendant, and the
litigation also would be impermissible." The Court, focusing on
contacts and foreseeability rather than fairness, 71 found no dem-
onstration that the defendants had "purposefully avail[ed them-
selves] of the privilege of conducting activities"72 in Delaware
withiA the Hanson limitation. Defendants were not required to
acquire stock to hold their corporate positions,7" the sequestered
66. Id. at 216. Cf. O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 99 S. Ct. 639 (1978) (affirming the constitutionality of quasi in rem jurisdiction
adopted by the New York Court of Appeals in Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d
312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966)). Jurisdiction was based on the attachment of the insurance
company's policy protecting Lee-Hy Paving Corporation from tort liability. The court
found that the attached obligation of the insurance company to defend the claim against
the nonresident named defendants "clearly encompassed" the personal-injury and
wrongful-death claims of the New York plaintiff, unlike the sequestered shares in Shaffer,
which were completely unrelated to.the cause of action. 579 F.2d at 199. Despite the fact
that there were "admittedly no contacts between the named defendants and New York"
and that the accident occurred in Virginia, the court in a "practical appraisal" of the
situation found no unfairness in the assertion of jurisdiction over the insurance company
doing business in New York. Id. at 198, 200. Finding serious questions of due process in
the judicially created Seider doctrine in light of the standards in Shaffer, Justices Powell
and Blackmun dissented from the denial of certiorari, 99 S. Ct. at 639.
67. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 169 (Michie 1974) makes Delaware the situs of ownership
of all stock in Delaware corporations, even though both the owner and custodian of the
shares are elsewhere. Id. at tit. 10, § 366 renders such assets of nonresidents subject to
sequestration. 433 U.S. at 214, 218.
68. 433 U.S. at 196, 214.
69. Id. at 212 (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 209.
71. See Casad, Shaffer v. Heitner: An End to Ambivalence in Jurisdiction Theory?,
26 KAN. L. REv. 61, 76 (1977).
72. 433 U.S. at 216 (citing Hansen v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)) (alterations
in Shaffer).
73. 433 U.S. at 216.
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stock was not the subject matter of the litigation, no acts were
alleged to have taken place in Delaware,74 and Delaware had no
statute equating the acceptance of a directorship with consent to
jurisdiction.75
Kulko and Shaffer added to the emphasis in Hanson on pur-.
posive involvement by the defendant. Both Kulko and Shaffer
require that the defendant's act be one that would lead him rea-
sonably to expect to be brought before the court.78 As Mr. Justice
Stevens pointed out in his concurring opinion in Shaffer, the due
process clause has historically served as protection against judg-
ments entered when the defendant had not received notice.7 He
saw the requirement of fair notice to a defendant as including a
warning that a particular activity may subject a participant to
the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign. Although it is unclear how"
much warning is necessary," the Court has determined that the
nonresident individual who merely purchases stock in a domestic
company or acquiesces in a child's living preference cannot have
reasonably foreseen that his actions would subject him to per-
sonal jurisdiction when there is no particularized long-arm stat-
ute." Whether a specific statute conferring jurisdiction will auto-
matically provide ties between a defendant and the state consis-
tent with due process standards is not clear. The following crucial
question will remain for decisions on a case-by-case basis: has the
defendant established with the forum state such contacts, ties, or
relations that would justify requiring him to answer in the courts
of that state? A specific statute does have the advantage of pro-
viding some warning to the defendant and may permit the state's
interest in that activity to be given greater weight in evaluating
74. Id. at 213.
75. Id. at 216. The Court noted that some states do have such statutory provisions
and cited S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-5-70 (1976). 433 U.S. at 216 n.47. The Delaware legislature
has subsequently enacted such a measure. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114 (Michie Cum.
Supp. 1978). Presumably nonresident corporate directors would be forewarned of their
amenability to suit and would be subject to in personam jurisdiction under such statutes
for the same misconduct as alleged in Shaffer. An interesting question is whether a com-
prehensive jurisdictional statute, "to the constitutional limits of due process," would
support in personam jurisdiction. The Shaffer Court's requirement of notice and the
foreseeability of personal jurisdiction in a distant forum would not be met.
76. 436 U.S. at 97-98; 433 U.S. at 216.
77. 433 U.S. at 217-18 (Stevens, J., concurring).
78. E.g., nonresident drivers of motor vehicles have long been subject to suit in
foreign jurisdictions. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979); Hess v. Pawloski,
274 U.S. 352 (1927).
79. 436 U.S. at 97-98; 433 U.S. at 214-15.
566 [Vol. 31
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the jurisdictional basis for the suit. In denying the assertion of
jurisdiction in Kulko, Shaffer, and Hanson, the Court noted the
absence of statutorily delineated state interests."0
There may be several reasons why the Court chose to grant
certiorari in Kulko. According to the dissent, the decision could
have gone either way.' California courts had been unanimous in
their decision that the father was subject to personal jurisdiction
in that state. Kulko may indicate the Court's willingness to re-
view other cases with jurisdictional issues. 2 More likely it indi-
cates that the court felt a need to reestablish controls on state-
court jurisdiction over nonresident individuals by emphasizing
and elaborating on the requirement of purposive activity by the
defendant within the state. In interpreting the criteria of Hanson,
the Court determined that the state's benefits afforded the non-
resident father must be ones that he personally sought for him-
self. The benefits extended by the state to his children were not
to be attributed to the father; in addition, the state's care of his
children could not lead him to foresee amenability to suit for their
support in a manner that would satisfy due process.,
An underlying purpose for the decision in Kulko may have
been the Court's desire to develop a solution to over-expansive
state-court jurisdiction under the "minimum contacts" test.84
The Court could have concluded merely that due process had
been denied in subjecting the father to in personam jurisdiction
in California. The Court continued, however, and found that
"basic considerations of fairness"" pointed to New York as the
appropriate forum. Not only was it the state of the defendant's
residence, but it was also the state of marital domicile and the
state in which the mother signed the separation agreement. The
80. 357 U.S. at 252; 436 U.S. at 98; 433 U.S. at 214, 216. The Court in Kulko noted
that in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 221, 223-24 (1957), jurisdiction
was upheld because California's interest in providing residents with a means of redress
against foreign instirers was statutorily expressed. 436 U.S. at 98.
81. 436 U.S. at 102 (Brennan, J., joined by White and Powell, JJ., dissenting).
82. But see O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.) cert. denied,
99 S. Ct. 639 (1978). See note 66 supra.
83. 436 U.S. at 94, 98. See text accompanying notes 23-29 supra.
84. See A. EHRENZWEIG & D. LouisEu., JURISDICTION IN A NUTSHELL, 228-30 (3d ed.
1973). Professor Ehrenzweig suggests the need for a forum conveniens doctrine when the
"minimum contacts" analysis becomes as rigid and irrational as the systems it was de-
signed to replace. Uniform legislation could provide what might be called an "interstate
venue" provision. Id. at 32. See also Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdic-
tion: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 312-14 (1956).
85. 436 U.S. at 97.
1980]
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Court noted that while the mother would be indemnified for her
expenses in litigating matters arising out of the separation agree-
ment in New York, the father would have to bear the expense and
inconvenience of traveling across the continent to litigate in a
forum with which he had little contact." By finding a forum in
which jurisdiction clearly existed and by finding no significant
reason to litigate in the mother's choice of forum, the court
seemed, in dicta, to develop what may be the forerunner of a
state-court forum conveniens doctrine or interstate venue provi-
sion.
The forum conveniens doctrine is rooted in the forum non
conveniens doctrine accepted in federal and most state courts.8 7
Under the forum non conveniens doctrine at least two fori where
the defendant is amenable to process are presumed available, and
the court may, in its discretion, dismiss the action when there is
no substantial or justifiable basis for the plaintiffs choice of
forum. For the choice among or between fori the doctrine fur-
nishes criteria such as interests of the plaintiff in proceeding in
the chosen forum, ease of access to sources of proof, availability
of witnesses, enforceability of a judgment, practical considera-
tions that make trial easier, and public interest factors.88
The forum non conveniens doctrine has been recognized by
commentators as a device to prevent, by avoiding a seriously
inconvenient forum to the defendant, abuses of expanding state-
court jurisdiction. 9 Because the conceptions of the constitutional
exercise of jurisdiction and the discretionary dismissal of jurisdic-
tion contain similar analyses of contacts and fairness, these prin-
ciples "may yet create a new American law of jurisdiction based
on the forum conveniens." 0 Thus, a court using the forum
86. See text accompanying notes 31 & 36 supra. California would accord full faith
and credit to any increase in child support determined in a New York court because New
York clearly has personal jurisdiction over the father.
87. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); Goodwine v. Superior
Court, 63 Cal. 2d 481, 407 P.2d 1, 47 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1965); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v.
Estes, 353 Mass. 90, 228 N.E.2d 440 (1967).
88. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947).
89. Casad, Long Arm and Convenient Forum, 20 KAN. L. Rxv. 1, 13 (1971); Ehren-
zweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum
Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 312 (1956).
90. A. EHRENZWEIG, TREA.SE ON CONFucr OF LAws 122 (1962). Mr. Justice Powell
noted the similarities between factors considered in the minimum-contacts analysis of
jurisdiction and the doctrine of forum non conveniens in his dissent to the denial of
certiorari in O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S.
Ct. 639 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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conveniens doctrine would look for the most convenient and fair
forum in which to litigate, and would transfer the matter there.
In the federal system, the forum conveniens concept is accom-
plished through the liberal transfer power provided in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a), 11 which allows a district court to transfer an action to
another district court in which the action originally might have
been brought, when such transfer is in the interests of justice and
for the convenience of the parties and witnesses. In contrast, a
state court has no authority under the existing federal system to
transfer litigation from its own judicial system to that of a sister
state. In a practical sense, however, a state court may obtain the
same results under the forum non conveniens doctrine by condi-
tioning its dismissal on the defendant consenting to suit in the
alternative forum and waiving any statute of limitations de-
fense.9
IV. THE USE OF LONG-ARM STATUTES IN DOMESTIC RELATIONS
CASES AFTER Kulko
State courts have exercised jurisdiction over nonresident de-
fendants in domestic relations matters by using a variety of long-
arm statutes. Some states, such as California," have adopted
comprehensive or omnibus statutes. Other states have adopted
91. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976) provides that: "[flor the convenience of parties and
witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any
other district or division where it might have been brought."
92. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960); Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349
U.S. 29 (1955).
93. See, e.g., MacLeod v. MacLeod, 383 A.2d 39 (Me. 1978), in which the former wife,
a Virginia resident, sued the former husband, a resident of Thailand, for amounts alleg-
edly due for alimony and child support under a French divorce decree. The wife personally
served the husband at his parents' residence in Maine. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine reversed the trial court's dismissal under forum non conveniens because Thailand
was not an "alternative forum" available to the wife. The court stayed the action on the
condition that the husband submit to the jurisdiction of the Virginia courts and waive any
statute of limitations defense. Accord, Vargas v. A.H. Bull S.S. Co., 44 N.J. Super. 536,
131 A.2d 39 (Super. Ct. Law Div.), affl'd, 25 N.J. 293, 135 A.2d 857 (1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 958 (1958); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Creole Petroleum Corp., 23 N.Y.2d 717, 244 N.E.2d
56 (1968). California has adopted a statute that approaches the concept of the forum
conveniens doctrine. CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 410.30(a) (West 1973) states as follows:
When a court upon motion of a party or its own motion finds that in the interest
of substantial justice an action should be heard in a forum outside this state,
the court shall stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part on any conditions
that may be just.
94. See note 6 supra.
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more traditional long-arm statutes which utilize "transaction of
business, commission of tortious acts within the state," or
"resident of the state at the time the cause of action arose" provi-
sions. 5 Statutes specifically designed for domestic relations use
recently have been enacted in several states. Kulko and its prede-
cessors"8 provide general guidelines for the courts in applying
these statutes. A defendant must have conducted some purposive
activity, which has benefited him personally, within the forum.
His activities must also be of a nature that would lead him to
foresee the assertion of jurisdiction by the foreign forum. In the
"minimum contacts" analysis, marital domicile and the exercise
of a separation agreement in the forum are important considera-
tions. Increased weight may be given to a statutory expression of
the state's public policy regarding family relations. In addition,
a court may question whether it is the most suitable place to
litigate the matter. If the court declines to exercise jurisdiction,
the only alternative presently available to a plaintiff who cannot
travel to the defendant's forum is the Uniform Reciprocal En-
forcement of Support Act."
Kulko has cast a shadow on.the use of omnibus statutes that
provide for jurisdiction over nonresidents on any basis consistent
with due process. 8 When the language is overbroad, judicial con-
struction is necessary to determine the constitutional boundaries
of in personam jurisdiction. These comprehensive statutes leave
greater room for error and create an opportunity for courts to
misuse the applicable standards.9 An example of this misplaced
emphasis is the California court's use of the "effects" test from
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws ' as the rationale
for jurisdiction over Ezra Kulko. l1 Continual relitigation, as the
boundaries of omnibus statutes are tested, reduces judicial effi-
95. See generally Annot., 76 A.L.R. 3d 708 (1977), for a discussion of "tortious con-
duct" and "transaction of business" long-arm applications.
96. For an excellent treatment of this area prior to Kulko see Comment, State Court
Jurisdiction: The Long-Arm Reaches Domestic Relations Cases, 6 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 1021
(1975).
97. See note 39 supra.
98. See text accompanying notes 38-40 & 79-80 supra.
99. See generally Anderson, Using Long-Arm Jurisdiction to Enforce Marital
Obligations, 11 J. F^M. L. 67 (1971); Anderson, Using Long-Arm Jurisdiction to Enforce
Marital Obligations, 42 Miss. L.J. 183 (1971). Anderson suggests that a contraction rather
than an expansion of jurisdiction may occur under a statute that has no guidelines for its
application.
100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFucr OF LAWS § 37 (1971).
101. See notes 34-35 and accompanying text supra.
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ciency and causes conflicting adjudication within the courts of
the state."2 The guidelines suggested in Kulko will be most help-
ful to courts attempting to redefine the reach of the omnibus
statutes.
Jurisdiction based on a traditional long-arm "transaction of
business within the state" provision probably would continue to
be upheld when the parties executed a separation agreement
within the state, the cause of action is based directly on that
agreement, and other contacts, such as using the court or finan-
cial systems of the stite or previously maintaining a domicile
within the state, exist between the nonresident and the forum." 3
102. E.g., several conflicting interpretations have been made regarding OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 1701.03 (West Supp. 1979-80), which provides in pertinent part:
(a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts di-
rectly or by an agent, as to a cause of action or claim for relief arising from the
person's:
(7) maintaining any other relation to this state or to persons or property
including support for minor children who are residents of this state which affords
a basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction by this state consistently with
the Constitution of the United States.
In Hines v. Clendenning, 465 P.2d 460, 463 (Okla. 1970), the Oklahoma Supreme Court
found the "minimum contacts" test satisfied under the totality of the circumstances
approach. The court noted the following contacts: the marriage was contracted in Okla-
homa; the parties twice resided there under circumstances indicating domicile; the defen-
dant attended college there; he registered to vote and did vote there; he sent his wife back
to Oklahoma and refused to permit her to return to him in California; and the wife, at
her husband's direction, was effectively abandoned in Oklahoma. The court also stated
that the wife's right, if any, to alimony may be said to have accrued at least in part in
Oklahoma, that an estimate of the inconveniences does not preclude jurisdiction, and that
Oklahoma has a "manifest interest" in the marital and financial status of its residents.
In Dunn v. Dunn, 550 P.2d 1369 (Okla. App. 1976), the Court of Appeals affirmed an order
vacating jurisdiction over a nonresident husband who had never lived in Oklahoma, who
had not transacted, either personally or by an agent, any business therein, and who was
not legally obligated to support his wife's children by a former marriage. In Perdue v.
Saied, 566 P.2d 1168 (Okla. 1977), however, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a
serviceman stationed in Germany who had never been in Oklahoma and never had any
previous contacts with the state was subject to a suit that requested an increase in the
support provisions of an Arizona divorce decree simply because his former wife and child
had moved into the state. Conversely, in Hudson v. Hudson, 569 P.2d 521 (Okla. App.
1977), the Court of Appeals denied jurisdiction over a serviceman stationed in California
to modify prospectively a support order entered by a California court where there was no
allegation that he had regularly paid child support in Oklahoma. The mother had the
alternative of proceeding under URESA.
103. In Van Wagenberg v. Van Wagenberg, 241 Md. 154, 215 A.2d 812, cert. denied,
385 U.S. 833 (1966), the Maryland Court of Appeals upheld a New York default judgment
for arrears of support payments due under the terms of a New York separation agreement
which required the former htsband to send support payments and maintain security for
his performance with a New York brokerage firm. The court found that "transaction of
business" was not limited to commercial transactions and that the cause of action was
17
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The generalization that "[t]he mere exercise of a separation
agreement in a state . . . [is] sufficient"'' 4 to confer personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in a suit to enforce that
agreement' °5 must be qualified by the Shaffer requirement that
some meaningful relationship exist between the defendant and
the forum or the litigation. The Kulko decision, in suggesting the
need for some personal or commercial benefit to a defendant,
would support a holding that merely sending support payments
and communicating with children in the foreign state does not
constitute "transaction of business.' 0 8
Traditional long-arm statutes providing jurisdiction over
nonresidents who commit "tortious acts within the state" have
met mixed reactions in state courts when they have been applied
to the failure of a nonresident to support his child. Those courts
broadly construing the term "tortious" to include any act that
concerned the breach of duty to another, inchiding the failure to
directly based on the New York contract. Id. at 176, 215 A.2d at 824. Jurisdiction was
upheld in Kochenthal v. Kochenthal, 28 App. Div. 2d 117, 282 N.Y.S.2d 36 (1967), in
which the separation agreement was executed in New York while both parties were resi-
dents of that state. In Mroczynski v. McGrath, 34 Ill. 2d 451, 454, 216 N.E.2d 137, 139
(1966), however, the court refused to extend the concept of "transaction of business within
the state" to the establishment of a marital domicile and the birth of a child. The Illinois
Supreme Court held that the wording commonly meant commercial business; the cause
of action was not based on defendant's business within the state but concerned declaring
a portion of his deceased father's will null and void. Id. at 455, 216 N.E.2d at 140. In
Wright v. Wright, 114 N.J. Super. 439, 442, 276 A.2d 878, 880 (Ch. Div. 1971), personal
jurisdiction was upheld over a nonresident in a separate maintenance action on the basis
of his "doing business in the state" by writing a weekly column for a New Jersey newspa-
per. It should be noted that New Jersey was the marital domicile for four years and was
the place from which the defendant left his family. In Titus v. Superior Court, 23 Cal.
App. 3d 792, 100 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1972), the court refused to extend "transaction of any
business" to the forwarding of a temporary custody agreement for the mother's signature.
In Carmichael v. Carmichael, 40 App. Div. 2d 514, 333 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1972), the court
found that the incorporation of provisions of a separation agreement executed in New York
into a Mexican divorce decree did not provide a nexus between the business transacted
in New York and the enforcement proceeding sufficient to sustain jurisdiction over the
nonresident husband. In Ross v. Ross, 358 N.E.2d 437 (Mass. 1976), however, personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident former wife was allowed on a "transaction of business"
rationale where the separation agreement which she had signed in New Jersey was incor-
porated into a Massachusetts divorce decree and she had used the courts of that state to
modify the decree.
104. Ross v. Ross, 358 N.E.2d 437, 439 (Mass. 1976).
105. Id.
106. See Judd v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. App. 3d 38, 131 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1976)
(personal jurisdiction over nonresident father denied when father never had custody of
children, he had not sent them to live in California, and his only contacts .vith California
were sending the children support payments and visiting them).
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support children, have upheld jurisdiction. ' Those courts
strictly construing the term "tortious" to encompass both the act
itself and the injury, however, have refused to exercise jurisdic-
tion. ' Future reliance on this form of jurisdiction seems limited
by the forum state's construction of the term "tortious" and the
existence of other contacts sufficient to make the exercise of juris-
diction reasonable. Also, the requirement of a purposeful activity
benefiting the defendant must be satisfied.' 9
If jurisdiction were based on a traditional long-arm statute
providing for jurisdiction over a nonresident who was a resident
of the state at the time the cause of action arose,' 0 jurisdiction
probably would be upheld if the parties had maintained a marital
domicile within the state and the defendant had left without
providing support for the remaining family."' It is interesting
107. See, e.g., Poindexter v. Willis, 37 Ill. App. 2d 213, 231 N.E.2d 1 (1967); Nelson
v. Nelson, 298 Minn. 438, 216 N.W.2d 140 (1974); Gentry v. Davis, 512 S.W.2d 4 (Tenn.
1974). It should be noted, however, that these cases concern nonsupport of illegitimate
children.
108. See, e.g., Inkelas v. Inkelas, 58 Misc. 2d 340, 295 N.Y.S.2d 350, 352-53 (Sup. Ct.
1968) (holding that failure to carry out marital obligations of support and maintenance is
not tortious conduct within the meaning of the New York statute); In re Marriage of
Bryan, 28 Or. App. 169, 558 P.2d 1288 (1977) (additionally noting that Oregon has a
specific domestic relations statute that should have been used).
109. See Boyer v. Boyer, 73 Ill. 2d 331, 383 N.E.2d 223 (1978), in which the Illinois
Supreme Court, relying on Kulko, refused to extend jurisdiction over a nonresident father
for his alleged tortious act of failure to make alimony and support payments, as required
by a foreign divorce decree, to his ex-wife and children who resided in Illinois. The lower
court had upheld the exercise of jurisdiction based on Poindexter v. Willis, 37 Ill. App.
2d 213, 231 N.E.2d 1 (1967). The supreme court determined that the quality and nature
of the father's activities in Illinois were not such that it would be reasonable and fair to
require him to conduct his defense in Illinois, regardless of whether nonpayment of support
is a tortious act. 73 Ill. 2d at 337, 383 N.E.2d at 227.
110. See, e.g., Amiz. REv. STAT. ANN., Rules of Civ. Proc. 4(e)(2) (West 1973), which
provides in relevant part:
When the defendant is a resident of this state, or is a corporation doing business
in this state, or is a person, partnership, corporation or unincorporated associa-
tion subject to suit in a common name which has caused an event to occur in
this state out of which the claim which is the subject of the complaint arose,
service may be made as herein provided, andwhen so made shall be of the same
effect as personal service within the state.
111. Id. See, e.g., Nickerson v. Nickerson, 25 Ariz. App. 251, 542 P.2d 1131 (1975)
(held that the establishment of a marital domicile caused an event to occur, but required
that Arizona be the last state of marital domicile); Bunker v. Bunker, 552 S.W.2d 641
(Ark. 1977) (upheld jurisdiction because Arkansas was the last marital domicile, the
nonresident husband's asserted wrongful conduct in the state created the cause of action
for divorce and alimony, the husband left voluntarily, creating a hardship on the wife if
he were not subject to the court's jurisdiction, and Arkansas was where the wife and
children continued to reside, their expenses were to be paid, and any witnesses resided;
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that the present California jurisdictional statute' 2 replaced an
earlier version that granted jurisdiction over defendants who were
residents when the cause of action arose, and that the United
States Supreme Court twice refused the opportunity to rule un-
constitutional exercises of jurisdiction pursuant to the earlier
statute."3
Several states have enacted specific domestic relations long-
arm statutes in an effort to alleviate any judicial construction
problems with the more general statutes.' The compelling state
the court also noted the presence of a specific statute for jurisdiction for child-support
actions); Mitchim v. Mitchim, 518 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1975) (upheld the exercise of jurisdic-
tion over a Texas resident pursuant to the Arizona long-arm statute on the basis that
Arizona was the marital domicile for five years, the defendant made payments on a home
there and sent money to his former wife who continued to reside in Arizona, and the wife
filed suit there less than six months after he left).
112. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973). See note 6 supra.
113. In Mizner v. Mizner, 84 Nev. 268, 439 P.2d 679, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968),
the Nevada Supreme Court upheld a California divorce and alimony decree over a Nevada
resident, because the parties had been domiciled in California until their separation and
the wife's cause of action for cruelty was presumed to arise out of the husband's conduct
while they were living together. Soule v. Soule, 193 Cal. App. 2d 443, 14 Cal. Rptr. 417
(1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 985 (1962), was the first decision to apply a long-arm statute
in the domestic relations area (during their marriage both parties were domiciled in
California and "the cause of action" arose during that time but the defendant perma-
nently moved to Montana before suit was commenced).
114. In 1964 Kansas enacted the first specific domestic relations long-arm statute.
KAN. CIv. PRO. STAT. ANN. § 60-308 (Vernon 1965 & Vernon Supp. 1978) provides in
relevant part as follows:
(a) Proof and effect.
(1) Personal service of summons may be made upon any party outside the
state. If upon a person domiciled in this state or upon a person who has submit-
ted to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, it shall have the force and effect
of personal service of summons within this state; otherwise it shall have the force
and effect of service by publication ....
(b) Submitting to jurisdiction-process. Any person, whether or not a citi-
zen or resident of this state, who in person or through an agent or instrumental-
ity does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits said person,
and, if an individual, his or her personal representative, to the jurisdiction of
the courts of this state as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any of
said acts:
(8) Living in the marital relationship within the state notwithstanding sub-
sequent departure from the state, as to all obligations arising for alimony, child
support, or property settlement under article 16, if the other party to the marital
relationship continues to reside in the state ....
Domestic long-arm statutes of other states include: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2446 (Bobbs-
Merrill Supp. 1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48-193(1)(e) (Harrison 1976); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 5-514(e) (Bobbs-Merrill 1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(1)(e) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1979); IND. CODE ANN., Trial R. 4.4(A)(7) (Burns 1973); NEv. REv. STAT. § 14.065.2(e)
(1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-16.A.(5) (Michie 1978); N.Y. Civ. PRc. LAw § 302(b)
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interest in providing a forum for domestic matters, indicated by
these specific statutes, may expressly limit their applicability to
domestic matters arising when the parties maintained a marital
domicile within the state."1 5 The requirement of a marital domi-
cile assures the court that the defendant personally had been
(McKinney Supp. 1979-80); OKuA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1701.03 (West Supp. 1979-80);
TEx. FAi. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 3.26(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
27-24(6) (1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 801.05(11) (West Supp. 1979-80).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-21-830 (1976) may be interpreted as an attempt at a specific
domestic relations long-arm provision. The statute provides the following:
(a) The court shall have jurisdiction, and a husband may be required to
furnish support or may be liable for nonsupport, as provided above, if, at the
time of the filing of the petition for support:
(1) He is residing or domiciled in the county or when such area is the
matrimonial domicile of the parties; or
(2) He is not residing or domiciled in the area referred to in subsection (1),
but is found therein at such time, provided the petitioner is so residing or
domiciled at such time; or
(3) He is neither residing or domiciled nor found in such area but, prior to
such time and while so residing or domiciled, he shall have failed to furnish such
support or shall have abandoned his wife or child and thereafter shall have failed
to furnish such support, provided that the petitioner is so residing or domiciled
at that time.
(b) The petitioner need not continue to reside or be domiciled in such area
where the cause of action arose, as provided in subsections (2) and (3) of this
section, if the conduct of the respondent has been such as to make it unsafe or
improper for her to so reside or be domiciled, and the petitioner may bring action
ini the court of the jurisdiction wherein she is thusly residing or has become
domiciled.
Id. The statute was introduced in the state legislature in 1968, at about the same time
other states were passing specific domestic relations long-arm provisions. The statute's
legislative history, however, provides no insight into its scope and purpose. The South
Carolina courts also have not ruled on its application as a domestic relations long-arm
provision. Although section 14-21-830(a)(3) would seem to provide a basis for personal
jurisdiction when the party requesting support has remained within the state and the
defendant has abandoned or failed to furnish support while he was a resident of the state,
the other provisions of the statute may lead the court to construe it merely as a venue
statute.
115. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979), which provides
in relevant part:
(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in
person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby
submits such person, and, if an individual, his personal representative, to the
jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising from the
doing of any such acts:
(e) With respect to actions of divorce and separate maintenance, the main-
tenance in this State of a matrimonial domicile.
The exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to this statute over a nondomiciliary who had mar-
ried in Illinois and lived there with his wife for three weeks was upheld by the New
Hampshire Supreme Court in Nickas v. Nickas, 113 N.H. 261, 306 A.2d 51 (1973).
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afforded the benefits and protections of the state, thus satisfying
the Hanson limitation as interpreted by Kulko."51 The possibility
of forum shopping by the plaintiff is avoided because jurisdiction
is limited to that state in which the parties had maintained a
marital domicile and in which their domestic problems had ari-
sen.
Some states have further restricted their domestic relations
long-arm statutory requirements to plaintiffs who have continued
to reside in the marital domicile.' One state requires a minimum
marital relationship period of six months within the forum as well
as continuous domicile of the plaintiff within the state."' In some
states, the statute applies only to child-support actions rather
than all incidences arising from the marital relationship."' Re-
116. See text accompanying notes 25-29, 76 & 83 supra.
117. E.g., KAN. CIv. PRO. STAT. ANN. § 60-308 (Vernon 1965 & Vernon Supp. 1978)
(set out in relevant part at note 114 supra). In Scott v. Hall, 203 Kan. 331, 454 P.2d 449
(1969), the Kansas Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction based on this statute in an action
by the former wife's legal counsel for fees awarded in a divorce action. See also N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. LAW § 302(b) (McKinney Supp. 1979-80), which authorizes long-arm jurisdiction
in support or alimony proceedings when New York residency of the petitioner is coupled
with one of four facts. The statute provides in relevant part:
Personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendant in matrimonial actions or
family court proceedings. A court in any matrimonial action or family court
proceeding involving a demand for support or alimony may exercise personal
jurisdiction over the respondent or defendant notwithstanding the fact that he
or she no longer is a resident or domiciliary of this state, or over his or her
executor or administrator, if the party seeking support is a resident of or domi-
ciled in this state at the time such demand is made, provided that this state
was the matrimonial domicile of the parties before their separation, or the
defendant abandoned the plaintiff in this state, or the obligation to pay support
or alimony accrued under the laws of this state or under an agreement executed
in this state.
Id.
118. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 801.05 (West Supp. 1979-80) provides in relevant part:
A court of this state having jurisdiction of the subject matter has jurisdiction
over a person . . . under any of the following circumstances:
(11) Certain marital actions. In. . .any action affecting marriage in which a
personal claim is asserted . .. when the respondent resided in this state in
marital relationship with the petitioner for not less than 6 consecutive months
within the 6 years next preceding the commencement of the action, and after
the respondent left the state the petitioner continued to reside in this state
In Dillon v. Dillon, 46 Wis. 2d 659, 176 N.W.2d 362 (1970), the Wisconsin Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of a similar predecessor statute, but the case was remanded
for a determination of whether the plaintiff-wife had maintained a continuous domicile
within the state.
119. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2446 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1979) provides as follows:
Any person who establishes or acquires a marital domicile in this state or who
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cent opinions show that the specific statutes are being strictly
construed by the lower courts. 20
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court used Kulko to restrict expanding state-
court jurisdiction over nonresident individuals. Kulko reaffirmed
the Hanson requirement that a state's benefits be purposefully
sought, and added a further requirement that those benefits be
directed toward the defendant personally. It reaffirmed the hold-
ing of Hanson that the fact that the state is the center of gravity
for choice-of-law purposes does not mean that the state has per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant. The Court also reiterated
the Shaffer limitations that the defendant's activities be ones
that would lead him reasonably to expect to be brought before a
foreign court, and that a substantial state interest is insufficient
if such interest has not been expressed in a particular statute.
The Court additionally limited the use of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) Conflict of Laws § 37 "effects" test to situations in which
commercial transactions have caused physical injury in the state
or commerical benefits have arisen from connections with the
state. The Court stressed that marital domicile and execution of
a separation agreement within the forum are important contacts
contracts marriage in this state or becomes a resident of this state while legally
married, and subsequently absents himself or herself from the State leaving a
dependent natural or adopted child or children in this State and fails to support
such child or children as required by the laws of this State, is hereby deemed
to have consented and submitted to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State
as to any cause of action brought against such person for the support and
maintenance of such child or children.
120. See, e.g., Corcoran v. Corcoran, 353 So. 2d 805 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978) (denied
jurisdiction based on the statutory language "marital relationship within the state if one
party continues to reside therein," ALA. CODE, Rules of Civ. Proc. 4.2(a)(2)(H) (1975),
because the parties had married in the state and lived there about four months
but for over four years thereafter had maintained their marital domicile in North Carolina
and the alleged wrongs were committed in North Carolina); In re Marriage of Rinder-
knecht, 367 N.E.2d 1128 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (denied jurisdiction over the Nebraska wife
because the parties had never lived in a marital relationship in Indiana even though the
husband had maintained his Indiana residency while he was in military service); Varney
v. Varney, 222 Kan. 700, 567 P.2d 876 (1977) (upheld jurisdiction because the parties
maintained a marital domicile within the state for three years and the husband continued
to reside there after the wife and children left for Tennessee); Scott v. Scott, 554 S.W.2d
274 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977) (upheld jurisdiction over a nonresident wife because the require-
ments of the long-arm statute had been met-Texas was the last state of marital co-
habitation, the parties lived there together two and one-half months, and the suit was
commenced within the required two-year period).
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in the application of long-arm statutes to the domestic relations
area. Finally, the Court used Kulko to suggest that a forum
conveniens doctrine may be a possible solution to the problem of
jurisdiction based on "minimum contacts."
Karen J. Williams
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